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use-inheritance as the cause of an attribute that could not easily be explained by natural selection.
After he had returned from his voyage, Darwin often visited the Zoological Society, where he had deposited for analysis and classification many of the animal specimens he had brought back on the Beagle; he thus had frequent occasion to visit the Society's menageries.
During April 1838, he spent some time watching the apes and monkeys at the gardens; and he reflected on their emotional out-bursts, which seemed to him quite human-like. He was especially interested in an orangutan that "kicked & cried, precisely like a naughty child" when teased by its keeper. 8 In his notebooks, he placed such typical reactions within the framework of his theory of instinct: "Expression, is an hereditary habitual movement consequent on some action, which the progenitor did, when excited or disturbed by the same cause, which <<now>> excites the expression." 9 So, for example, Darwin speculated that the emotional response of surprise-raised eyebrows, retracted eyelids, etc.-had arisen by association with our ancestors'
efforts to see objects in dim light; now when the analogously unexpected object or event confronted us, we would react in an instinctual way, even though the light was perfectly adequate. 10 In this construction, the expression of emotion thus had no particular usefulness; it was understood, rather, as a kind of accidental holdover from the customary behavior of ancestors. Darwin would retain this basic notion about emotional display for the account he would later develop in the Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Emotional expression had its roots in instinct, and, in Darwin's view, reason did as well.
In August 1838, Darwin began reading David Hume's Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding. 11 Hume's representation of ideas as less vivid copies of sensations perfectly accorded with Darwin's intuitions about the continuity of animal and human mentality: for if 5 ideas were copies of impressions, animals would be perfectly capable of thought. Darwin developed this sensationalist epistemology in his Notebook N, where he proposed that simple reasoning consisted in the comparison of sensory images and that the recollection of several such images producing a pleasant state was of the very nature of complex thought. 12 And just as
Hume understood reason to be a kind of "wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls," 13 so
Darwin as well thought of intellectual activity to be a "modification of instinct-an unfolding & generalizing of the means by which an instinct is transmitted." 14 Human intelligence was thus not opposed to animal instinct but grew out of it in the course of ages.
In finding the antecedents of human rationality in animal sources, Darwin really opened no new epistemological ground. Carl Gustav Carus, Goethe's disciple and an author whom
Darwin read in early 1838, asserted the decidedly romantic thesis that mind and matter ran together throughout nature. Adopting Carus's language, Darwin contemplated a nature alive with mind. He reflected that "there is one living spirit, prevalent over this world. . . which assumes a multitude of forms according to subordinate laws." And like Carus, he concluded that "there is one thinking . . . principle intimately allied to one kind of matter-brain" and that this thinking principle "is modified into endless forms, bearing a close relation in degree and kind to the endless forms of the living beings." 15 Darwin's assumption of cognitive continuity between men and animals would not even have offended the religiously minded among his own countrymen. Several natural theologians whom he read during the late 1830s and early 1840s-John Fleming, Algernon Wells, and Henry Lord Brougham, for instance-did not blanch to find some glimmer of reason exhibited even among the lower animals. 16 But no animal, in the estimation of these British writers, gave evidence of any hint of what was truly distinctive of 6 human mind-namely, moral judgment. If Darwin were to solidify his case for the descent of man from lower animals, he would have to discover the roots of moral behavior even among those creatures. And so he did.
III. Moral Theory Prior to the Origin of Species
Darwin's own moral sensitivities received considerable assault during his South
American travels, especially from the Brazilian slave trade. His family cultivated strong abolitionist sentiments, which originated with both of his grandfathers; and his sisters kept him informed about the efforts in Parliament to emancipate the slaves in the British colonies.
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Darwin had his convictions reinforced by the many observations Humboldt himself had made about the loathsome trade in human beings. 18 Darwin's own fury could be barely suppressed when he witnessed African families being separated at slave auctions and slaves being beaten and degraded. When finally the Beagle left Brazil, he rejoiced that "I shall never again visit a slave-country." He perceived immediately that utilitarian motives would do little to restrain this kind of evil: "It is argued that self-interest will prevent excessive cruelty; as if self-interest protected our domestic animals, which are far less likely than degraded slaves, to stir up the rage of their savage masters. It is an argument long since protested against with noble feeling, and strikingly exemplified, by the ever illustrious Darwin worked out the basic framework of his moral conception without the aid of that theory he had recently formulated, namely that of natural selection. When he began to apply the device of natural selection to explain instincts, however, he stumbled at the brink of a yawning conceptual abyss, which threatened to swallow his entire theory of evolution by natural selection.
The crucial difficulty was this: the social instincts most frequently gave advantage to the recipients of moral actions, not to their agents; but natural selection preserved individuals because of traits advantageous to themselves, not to others. Darwin first met this difficulty when studying the social insects in the 1840s, when the problem became even more complicated.
Soldier bees and ants displayed anatomical traits and instinctive behaviors that served the welfare of their colonies, not directly themselves. Indeed, a soldier bee might defend the hive at the cost of its own life. Moreover, these insects were neuters, consequently they could not in the first instance pass beneficial adaptations to succeeding generations. How then could their otherregarding traits be explained, and, more generally, how did the attributes of neuters arise?
Darwin worried about this problem for sometime, fearing it would allow the Creator a return to those provinces from which he had been lately banished. 23 Only during the first months of 1858, while laboring on the manuscript that would become, in its abridged form, the Origin of Species, did Darwin discover the solution to his problem: 
IV. Moral Structure of Nature in the Origin of Species
Darwin is usually taken to have introduced into biology a thoroughgoing mechanism. In the words of one set of scholars: "Natural-selection theory and physiological reductionism were explosive and powerful enough statements of a research program to occasion the replacement of one ideology-of God-by another: a mechanical, materialistic science." 25 This sort of coldblooded Darwinism, it appears, left man morally naked to the world, since nature, bereft of the divine stamp, became "morally meaningless"-or so it is commonly believed. 26 But did Man can act only on external and visible characters: nature cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects only for his own good; Nature only for that of the being which she tends . . . It may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, every variation, even the slightest, rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life.
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Nature works altruistically for the advantage of "the being which she tends," while man acts selfishly, selecting only for his own good. Can it be any wonder, then, that the productions of nature are "far 'truer' in character than man's productions"? They plainly manifest, in Darwin's resonate phrase, "the stamp of far higher workmanship." 28 The lilting poetry of these phrases might be taken as merely decorative metaphors, not harboring real substance. But if one traces the formulations back through the several manuscripts whence they derived, their more profound and, indeed, romantic meaning becomes obvious. In the corresponding passage from his essay of 1844, Darwin strove to make clear to himself, through images and metaphors, the conception of a selecting nature toward which he was groping:
Let us now suppose a Being with penetration sufficient to perceive differences in the outer and innermost organizations quite imperceptible to man, and with forethought extending over future centuries to watch with unerring care and select for any object the offspring of an organism produced under the foregoing circumstances; I can see no conceivable reason why he should not form a new race (or several were he to separate the stock of the original organism and work on several islands) adapted to new ends. As we assume his discrimination and his forethought, and his steadiness of object, to be incomparably greater than those 13 qualities in man, so we may suppose the beauty and complications of the adaptations of the new races and their differences from the original stock to be greater than in the domestic races produced by man's agency. 29 The being that Darwin here imagines has those qualities characteristic of the recently departed Deity. Acing with preternatural intelligence, it sees into the future, cares for the welfare of its creatures, and selects them for their beauty and progressive adaptations. This being, in more muted colors, continues to operate in the Origin of Species, where the guarantee is issued that since "natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress toward perfection." 30 Even despite the more reserved individual he had become, Darwin yet portrayed nature in the Origin of Species in the manner that he had absorbed from his Humboldtian experiences during his youthful voyage of adventure, namely, nature as having a moral and aesthetic intelligence. It is, then, not surprising that when he turned specifically to consider the distinctive character of human beings, he did not leave them bereft of those traits he accorded nature.
V. The Problem of Human Evolution, 1859-1871
In the late 1860s, Darwin initially approached the problem of human evolution quite modestly. He had originally intended to consider human beings only from the point of view of sexual selection, which he thought could explain the different attributes of males and females of the many races of mankind. thought, to inheritance from the male parent. In a letter to a young American female college student, he did venture that if women went to university and were schooled over generations as the sons of the gentry were, then they would, via use-inheritance, become as intelligent as men.
But were this to happen, "we may suspect that the easy education of our children, not to mention the happiness of our homes, would in this case greatly suffer." would have an accelerating effect on the evolutionary process, since social environments would rapidly change through responsive competition. Second, he proposed that selection worked on the group, rather than the individual-which allowed him to explain the rise of altruistic behavior, that is, behavior perhaps harmful to the individual but beneficial to the group. In his original essay on the transmutation of species (1858), Wallace conceived of the struggle for existence to occur among varieties instead of individuals. 34 He continued to think in such group terms when considering the evolution of moral behavior. Finally, in a note to the published version of his talk to the Anthropological Society, he mentioned that he was inspired to develop his thesis by reading Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. 35 Spencer's own early brand of socialism had pulled Wallace to his side. In Social Statics (1851), Spencer had envisioned a gradual and continual adjustment of human beings to the requirements of civil society, with individuals accommodating themselves to the needs of their fellows, so that eventually a classless society would emerge in which the greatest happiness for the greatest number would be realized. 36 Spencer assumed that the inheritance of useful habits would be the means by which such evolutionary progress would occur, while Wallace believed natural selection to be the agent of that progess. Wallace's faith in a naturalistic account of human evolutionary progress, however, succumbed to the evidence of higher powers at work in the land. Though raised as a materialist and agnostic, Wallace had chance to attend a séance, which piqued his empiricist inclinations.
Shortly thereafter, in 1866, he hired a medium in order to investigate the phenomena usually attendant on the invocation of the spirit world. Wallace, gentle soul that he was, became a true believer (unlike Darwin, who regarded spiritualism as rubbish). Wallace's new conviction focused his attention on certain human traits-naked skin, language, mathematical ability, ideas of justice, and abstract reasoning generally-that would confer no biological advantage on individuals in a low state of civilization. Indeed, Wallace believed that for sheer survival, human beings need a brain no larger than that of an orangutan, or perhaps one comparable to that of the average member of a London gentleman's club. Such traits as abstract reasoning and moral sensitivity, therefore, could not be explained by natural selection. Yet in both aboriginal and advanced societies, individuals displayed these qualities. While his friend Herbert Spencer regarded such properties as explicable only through use-inheritance, 38 Wallace found a unique explanatory mode of selection that his new faith could provide. 39 In his estimation, distinctively human traits had been artificially selected for us: "a superior intelligence," he proposed, "has guided the development of man in a definite direction, and for a special purpose, just as man guides the development of many animal and vegetable forms." 40 We were thus like domestic animals in the hands of higher spiritual powers, and they artificially selected distinctively human traits for our advantage.
When Darwin learned of Wallace's turnabout, he was dumb-founded: "But I groan over Man-you write like a metamorphosed (in the retrograde direction) naturalist, and you the author of the best paper that ever appeared in the Anthropological Review! Eheu! Eheu! Eheu!" The careless, squalid, unaspiring Irishman, fed on potatoes, living in a pig-sty, doting on a superstition, multiplies like rabbits or ephemera:-the frugal, foreseeing, self-respecting, ambitious Scot, stern in his morality, spiritual in his 18 faith, sagacious and disciplined in his intelligence, passes his best years in struggle and in celibacy, marries late, and leaves few behind him. . . In the eternal "struggle for existence," it would be the inferior and less favoured race that had prevailed-and prevailed by virtue not of its good qualities but of its faults. 42 The profligate and degenerate Irish yet seemed to be winning the evolutionary race in the trait that counted-reproduction. The considerations of Lyell, Wallace, and Greg spurred Darwin to expand his intended volume on sexual selection to tackle these apparent barriers to a naturalistic understanding of human evolution.
VI. Mind and Morals in the Descent of Man
In the face of Greg's argument, Darwin collected in the Descent considerable evidence about the fortunes of the reprobate. On the basis of this evidence, he maintained that many natural checks to the less fit would ultimately forestall their advance: the debauched would suffer higher mortality, criminals would sire fewer offspring, and the bad would likely die young. 43 Yet it could be that the likes of the Irish, though decidedly less able, would simply crowd out the British. After all, though evolutionary progress was general, it was "no invariable rule." 44 In his response to Greg's concern, Darwin made an implicit distinction between the meaning of fitness-i.e., certain properties, like high intelligence, moral judgment, etc. Lyell's and Wallace's objections to the application of natural selection in the case of man proved more difficult than that of Greg, but they brought Darwin to several ingenious solutions to the problems posed. Linguistic ability stood chief among the features of intelligence that had to be considered. In dealing with this problem, Darwin reverted to a theory he had initially entertained in his Notebook N, which he kept between 1838 and 1839. There he sought to develop a naturalistic account of the origin of language. He supposed that our aboriginal ancestors began imitating sounds of nature (e.g., "crack," "roar," "crash") and that language developed from these simple beginnings. 45 In the late 1860s, while working on the Descent, Darwin made frequent inquiries of his cousin, the linguist Hensleigh Wedgewood, about the origin of languages. Wedgewood had allowed that it was part of God's plan to have man instructed, as it were, by the natural development of speech. He argued that language began from an instinct for imitation of sounds of animals and natural events, which under "pressure of social wants" developed into a system of signs. 46 Darwin embraced this confirmation of his original ideas, though, of course, dispensing with the theological interpretation. If such men left children to inherit their mental superiority, the chance of the birth of still more ingenious members would be somewhat better, and in a very small tribe decidedly better. Even if they left no children, the tribe would still include their blood-relations; and it has been ascertained by agriculturists that by preserving and breeding from the family of an animal, which when slaughtered was found to be valuable, the desired character has been obtained. 52 Darwin enunciated here an idea that in our time has become known as "inclusive fitness." A heritable trait that confers little or no benefit on an individual but sufficiently advances the cause of relatives will be persevered and spread along with the group. Darwin first developed this theory of community selection to solve the problem of the evolution of the social insects; it now became the key to understanding the evolution of social human beings.
In the first volume of the Descent, the question of human moral judgment occupied the greatest measure of Darwin's attention. Moral sense was by common consent that attribute most distinctive of human beings. Both Lyell and Wallace could not conceive that a refined moral sense might have arisen naturally from animal stock. After all, moral behavior did not prove particularly beneficial to those exercising it-hence natural selection could not account for it. In It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet an increase in the number of well-endowed men will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, form possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection.
At all times throughout the world tribes have supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one element in their success, the standard of morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend to rise and increase. 53 Community selection proved an ingenious way to understand the evolution of human altruism. It yet had its own difficulty: How do these moral traits arise within one tribe in the first place? After all, as Darwin noted, it is not likely that parents of an altruistic temper would raise more children than those of a selfish attitude. Moreover, those who were inclined to selfsacrifice might leave no offspring at all. 54 Darwin employed his device of use-inheritance to explain the origin of such social behaviors within a given tribe. He proposed two related sources for such behaviors. The first is the prototype of contemporary theories of reciprocal altruism.
Darwin observed that as the reasoning powers of members of a tribe improved, each would come to learn from experience "that if he aided his fellow-men, he would commonly receive aid in return." From this "low motive," as he regarded it, each might develop the habit of performing benevolent actions, which habit might be inherited and thus furnish suitable material on which community selection might operate. The second source relied on the assumption that "praise and blame" of certain social behaviors would feed our animal need to enjoy the admiration of others and to avoid feelings of shame and reproach. This kind of social control would also lead to heritable habits. Further, he stuffed these books with experiments and mathematical calculations of his own devising. The language of his arguments and experiments did not have the dry, crusty sound of many of the empirical studies from which he drew. His prose had a poetic lilt and his tropes, such as nature scrutinizing the internal fabric of organisms, allowed the reader to feel the more comfortable presence of a larger power watching over all of life. But his metaphors carried a more significant burden. Their evocative surface encased a deep conceptual grammar that structured his thinking about nature so as to represent it as an intelligent, moral agent, one that finally intended "the most exalted object we are capable of conceiving, the production of the higher animals." 67 In this respect, as well, he took his lesson from Humboldt, who supposed that aesthetic judgment might provide an approach complementary to the analytic for understanding nature.
Many of Darwin's arguments had the multiply dependent structure of nature herself. He would advance several possible causes to explain the same event, holding those events in a tangled bank of organic relations. Thus, not only did he account for man's big brain by appeal to group selection, he had the inherited effects of language by which to reinforce his naturalistic theory. He secured human moral character with the interacting forces of community selection, reciprocal altruism, and inculcated habit. The principal force, community selection, along with an evolving intellect, would ensure that human nature might preserve an authentic moral core.
As he interpreted his own accomplishment, his theory thus escaped the reproach of grounding human moral capacity in "the base principle of selfishness." Darwin's subtle, artistic effects, 29 along with his voluminous evidence and compelling arguments, have rendered his conclusions powerful even today for the supple of mind.
